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1 Introduction
In the present paper, we study the stability of vertical collusive agreements
in the context of successive oligopolies. Such collusive agreements simultane-
ously embody downstream and upstream rms. Collusion is represented as an
agreement through which the insiders act in unison, reducing thereby the total
number of decision units operating in the downstream and upstream markets
and, thus, the corresponding number of oligopolists in each of them. Collusive
outcomes are the Cournot equilibria corresponding to these reduced numbers of
oligopolists, which are then compared with those arising when downstream and
upstream rms act independently from each other in their respective markets.
More than half a century ago, Stigler (1950) has stressed the main di¢ culty
encountered by a cartel promoter: "the major di¢ culty in forming a merger is
that it is more protable to be outside a merger than to be a participant. The
outsider sells at the same price but at the much larger output at which marginal
cost equals price. Hence, the promoter of a merger is likely to receive much
encouragement from each rm, almost every encouragement, in fact, except
participation". This sentence clearly illustrates the need for analyzing carefully
under which conditions a cartel is expected to resist to the forces acting against
its stability.
A denition of cartel stability, relying on two natural requirements, namely,
external stability and internal stability, has been proposed by dAspremont et
al., 1983, in the context of horizontal mergers. A cartel with n rms in an
industry embodying K rms (n > K) is said internally stable when the prots
realized by each rm member of the cartel exceeds the prots obtained when
being outside of it, taking into account the change in the prots of an outsider
resulting from this exit. Similarly, a cartel with K members is externally stable
when the prots of a rm member of a cartel of size K + 1 are smaller than the
prots realized by an outsider when the cartel is of size K: A cartel of size K is
stable when it is both internally and externally stable. Formally, assuming that
all rms are identical, and dening f (K) (resp. c(K)) the payo¤ received by
each outsider (resp. by each cartel member), a cartel of size K is stable if both
the inequalities
c(K)  f (K   1)
(internal stability) and
f (K + 1)  c(K)
(external stability) hold simultaneously.
This denition of stability is rather abstract since it does not state how the
prots of an insider or an outsider are dened or, equivalently, to which market
structure it corresponds. As a consequence, the above abstract denition can
be applied to a wide variety of market situations and corresponding payo¤s
structures. Nevertheless, the denition of stability assumes that each member
of the agreement receives the same share of prots, c(K); and, similarly, that
each outsider obtains an equal amount of prots, f (K). One way to rationalize
this assumption consists in supposing that all rms in the industry are identical,
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with the sole exception that either they participate to the collusive agreement,
or are outsiders. This assumption then allows to share equally the prots inside
the entity among its members through an argument of equal treatment. Fur-
thermore, supposing an identical strategic behavior for the outsiders allows to
state by an argument of symmetry that each one of them also should obtain
an equal amount of prots at the solution. With these assumptions, given an
entity of size K; prot sharing among rms is fully described by two numbers:
the share of prots received by each participant, c(K), and the prots received
by each outsider, f (K).
A rst example of market structure and associated payo¤s for which stability
has been analyzed can be found in the paper referred to above (dAspremont
et al., 1983). The solution at which the prots are evaluated are those cor-
responding to the price leadership model introduced by Markham (1951). In
this version, the cartel (collusive agreement) is assumed to be the price-leader
(the dominant rm) maximizing its prots on the "residual demand function",
while the outsiders are behaving competitively, taking the price set by the cartel
as given. It is easily seen that, for this specic market situation and payo¤s
structure, any cartel is always internally unstable simply because, according
to the argument put forward by Stigler (1950), the per-rm prots of a cartel
member are smaller than the prots obtained by each outsider. But this remark
does not prevent the existence of at least one stable cartel, as demonstrated in
dAspremont et al. (1983).
A second example of market structure in which a collusive agreement is
contemplated corresponds to the version proposed by Salant, Schwitzer and
Reynolds (1983) of the Cournot model. Compared with the price-leadership
model, this approach consists in assuming that a collusive agreement among
K rms takes place, according to which these rms maximize per rm prof-
its against the output choice of the outsiders. This situation represents the
Cournot equilibrium of the game consisting of the entity and n  K outsiders.
In this setup, stability has been analyzed by Sha¤er (1995), Bloch (1997) and
Belleamme and Peitz (2010). Assuming linear inverse demand and constant
marginal cost, Sha¤er (1995) shows that, whenever n  3; there exists no stable
horizontal cartel in the Cournot game. In a recent paper, Zu et al, (2012), bor-
rowing from Konishi and Lin (1999), study the size of horizontal stable cartels
using general specications for the output demand and cost function. These
authors conrm that, even with a more general specication, the size of stable
horizontal cartels remains quite reduced. The main reason why cartel stability
fails in Cournot competition refers to the Stigler statement reminded in the
beginning of this paper: outsiders are always better o¤ than insiders, which
destroys internal stability in the Cournot game. Accordingly, contrary to the
price leadership model in which there always exists a stable cartel, the Cournot
game with linear output demand and constant marginal cost has never a stable
cartel when the number of rms exceeds three.
The above studies all refer to collusive agreements embodying downstream
rms only, excluding thereby more general forms of collusive agreements, like
those arising when downstream and upstream rms are allowed to combine to-
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gether. Extending stability analysis to such collusive agreements is undoubtedly
interesting and important. Real-life collusive entities often share the property
that, among the participating rms, some of them operate in the upstream mar-
ket(s) and produce the input(s) used by the downstream rms in the produc-
tion of the nal good. Such agreements have been studied by Salinger (1988),
Gaudet and van Long (1996) and, more recently, by Gabszewicz and Zanaj
(2011). However, to the best of our knowledge, the analysis of collusive stability
in this context has not yet been pursued. Probably this is so because some
assumptions used in the traditional approach seem inappropriate in this new
set-up. Among these assumptions is the one stating that each member of the
agreement must receive the same share of the entitys prots. From the very na-
ture of the problem, the rms participating the entity belong to di¤erent types,
some producing the nal good (downstream rms) while the others produce the
input (upstream rms). When downstream and upstream rms are allowed to
combine together, with both upstream and downstream rms in the collusive
agreement, there is no longer any reason to assume that both types of rms
should get the same share of the entitys prots. Thus a conceptual problem
arises: how prots should be shared among the members of the collusive entity,
knowing that these members are not all identical, but belong to two di¤erent
types? We meet this di¢ culty in the present paper by assuming that partici-
pants share equally the marginal variation of prots of the entity caused by the
entry (exit) of a new participant. For instance, consider an entity composed by
one downstream and one upstream rm. If a new upstream (downstream) rm
enters the entity, the three participants share equally only the marginal prot
variation created by the entry of the new rm in the agreement.
We give a denition of stability that is a direct extension of the denition
of stability in dAspremont et al (1983). It requires that no upstream rm in
the entity would get more when leaving the entity than when staying inside
(internal stability), taking into account the change in prots resulting from its
move. Furthermore it requires that no rm outside the identity would obtain
more when entering the entity than staying outside, again taking into account
the change in prots resulting from its move (external stability). Thus this
denition requires not only that the cartel should be internally (resp. externally)
stable with respect to moves of rms of the same type, but also with respect
to moves of rms of the alternative type. It is interesting to notice that a
cartel embodying K rms in dAspremont et al. (1983) is stable if, and only
if, it corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the game with n players, two (pure)
strategies: "enter the entity-remain outside the entity" and payo¤s evaluated at
the price leadership solution with n K rms in the fringe.
A vertical agreement has three e¤ects: (i) it softens double marginalization
for the entity boosting its prot; (ii) it reduces the number of active upstream
rms in the upstream market leading to a shift upwards of the input supply
and it reduces the number of downstream rms that buy the input in the input
market causing a shift downwards of the input demand schedule. The balance
of these two shifts can lead to an increase of a decrease of the equilibrium input
price and, nally, (iii) it creates asymmetries in the production costs of the
4
downstream rms: the entity produces at the marginal cost while the down-
stream rms at the market price. The e¤ect on the equilibrium output price
is ambiguous. The equilibrium output price increases if the output quantity
increases due to the presence of the entity, or it may decrease, otherwise. The
stability of the vertical entity depends on the balance of these three e¤ects.
We show that the presence of upstream rms in the agreement allows stable
cartels even for n exceeding three. This is the case because Stiglers statement
according to which the only ones who benet from a collusive agreement are the
outsiders need not be valid in vertical agreements.
2 Stability of vertical agreements and successive
oligopolies
In the following we call vertical agreement any collusive entity involving simul-
taneously both downstream and upstream rm(s). In order to examine the
question of stability in the case of vertical agreements, we need a framework in
which these are analyzed and rmspayo¤s dened. This framework is provided
in Salinger (1988) and, more recently, by the authors in Gabszewicz and Zanaj
(2011), in which they propose a denition of successive oligopolies allowing a
precise concept of vertical agreement. The nature of the agreement concerns
(i) the payo¤ division among downstream and upstream participants, (ii) the
price of the input for the insider downstream rms and (iii) the behavior of the
insider upstream rms with respect to the input market. In the present paper,
we assume that participants share equally the marginal variation of prots of
the entity caused by the entry (exit) of a new participant.
To dene precisely the notion of stability of vertical agreements, consider
two successive markets embodying n identical downstream rms andm identical
upstream rms, m  2. Assume that K;K < n; downstream rms and H;H <
m; upstream rms decide to collude. Notice this entity now involves two types
of agents, all identical in each type. An entity of size K +H is stable when it is
both internally and externally stable, for each type of agents. Dene formally
f (K;H) (resp. c(K;H)) the payo¤ received by each downstream outsider
(resp. by each participant), and  f (K;H) (resp.  c(K;H)) the payo¤ received
by each upstream outsider (resp. by participant). Then,
Denition A vertical entity of size K + H is stable if both the sets of
inequalities
c(K;H)  f (K   1; H) and c(K;H)  f (K;H   1) (1)
 c(K;H)   f (K   1; H) and  c(K;H)   f (K;H   1) (2)
(internal stability) and
f (K + 1; H)  c(K;H) and f (K;H + 1)  c(K;H) (3)
 f (K + 1; H)   c(K;H) and  f (K;H + 1)   c(K;H) (4)
(external stability) hold simultaneously.
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This denition directly extends the denition of stability provided by
dAspremont et al (1983) to agreements that include two types of rms. More
precisely, a vertical collusive agreement embodying K+H is said internally sta-
ble when the prots realized by each type of rm, downstream and upstream,
member of the entity, exceeds the prots obtained when being outside of it, tak-
ing into account the change in the prots of an outsider, of any type, resulting
from this exit. Similarly, a vertical entity with K + H members is externally
stable when the prots of a rm, upstream or downstream, member of a entity
of size K + 1 or/and H + 1 are smaller than the prots realized by an outsider,
downstream and upstream, when the cartel is of size K + H: This denition
of stability translates into demanding four conditions for internal stability and
other four for the external stability of the collusive entity.
Now let us apply the denition of stability to the well-known case of linear
output demand and constant returns to scale in successive Cournot oligopolies.
Let the demand function for some output in the downstream market be given
by p(Q) = 1   Q; where Q denotes aggregate supply. Consider n downstream
rms producing the output via a constant returns technology f(z) = z;  > 0;
as well as m upstream rms initially supplying the market for the input z at a
constant marginal cost equal to ;  > 0. Now assume that H upstream rms,
h = 1; 2:::H; form a vertical collusive agreement with K downstream rms
k = 1; 2; :::K; and maximize joint prots together. Also assume that K < n and
H < m .1 After this agreement, the downstream and upstream markets move
from an initial situation with n active downstream rms and m active upstream
rms, to a market structure with n   K + 1 active rms in the downstream
market and m   H in the upstream one. An example of this type of vertical
collusive agreement is the agreement taking place in a market among one or
several wholesalers with one or several retailers that xes the price at which the
market product is sold to the nal consumers.2
Consider rst how the prot functions write in the downstream market after
the collusive agreement. To this end denote by I the entity resulting from
the agreement. The prots I of the entity I to which K downstream rms
participate is given by
I(qI;q I) = (1  qI  
X
i6=I
qi)qI    qI

(5)
where qI (resp.
P
i6=I qi ) denotes the supply of the entity (resp. rms not in
the agreement) in the downstream market and  is its unit production cost.
As for the downstream rms that do not participate in the agreement, each of
them obtains a payo¤ i dened by
1This assumption guarantees that there always exists at least one rm on each side of the
upstream market so that the cartel cannot exclude the outsider downstream rms to have
access to the input. A similar asssumption in another approach to collusion has been used by
Gabszewicz and Hansen (1971).
2For example, the French Competition Council in 2008 sanctioned ve toys manufacturers
and three distributors on grounds of collusion during the Christmas period between 2001 and
2004. ( La Revue, 2008)
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i(qi; qk) = (1  qI   qi  
X
k 6=i
qk)qi   !(qi

); (6)
with i; i 6= I; and ! denoting the unit price in the input market.3 Notice that
from the comparison between (5) and (6), it appears immediately that, while
the collusive members in the downstream market pay their input at marginal
cost , the rivals pay the input price !: Since I is concave in qI , we may use
the rst order condition to get the best reply function qI of the entity in the
downstream market game as
qI(qi 6=I) =
1    
P
i 6=I qi
2
:
As for an outsider downstream rm i, its best reply qi in the downstream market
is conditional on the input price ! realized in the upstream market, namely
qi(qI ; qk; !) =
1  !  

qI +
P
k 6=i;k 6=I qk

2
:
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium among the colluded downstream rms, we
get the resulting Cournot equilibrium in the downstream market, namely, the
optimal supply coming from the entity qI and from each of the rivals q

i which
do not belong to the cartel, namely
qI (K;!) =
   + (n K)(!   )
(n K + 2) ; (7)
and
qi (K;!) =
+    2!
 (n K + 2) : (8)
It is worth noting that the equilibrium in the downstream market depends on
the input price obtained in the upstream market as an immediate consequence of
supply and demand for the input. Taking into account (8) and the fact that q =
f(z) = z, it is easy to derive the input demand resulting from the n K outsider
rms in the downstream market, i.e.
P
i6=I zi(!) = (n   K)( + 2!2(N K+2) ): As
for the input supply, it comes from the strategies sj ; j 6= I; selected by the
outsider upstream rms in the input market. Consider the jth upstream rm
not participating in the entity. Its prots  j at the vector of strategies (sj ; s j)
write as
 j(sj ; S j) = !(sj ; S j)sj   sj ; (9)
with S j =
P
 j 6=I s j : Taking into account that !(sj ; s j) has to make demand
equal to supply in the upstream market, namely,
P
j 6=I sj =
P
i6=I zi(!) ; we
obtain
3Notice that the set fk : k 6= ig includes the index I:
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!(sj ; s j) =
(+ )(n K)  2(n K + 2)Pj 6=I sj
2 (n K) (10)
where
P
j 6=I sj = S j + sj : Accordingly, the payo¤ of the j-th upstream rm
writes as
 j(sj ; s j) =

(+)(n K) 2(n K+2)Pj 6=I sj
2(n K)

sj   sj :
It is immediate to derive from the above the best reply function sj = sj(S j):
Using the symmetry condition S j = (m   H   1)s j ; we derive the optimal
input supply sj coming from the j-th outsider rm, namely
sj (K;H) =
(  ) (n K)
2(n K + 2)(m H + 1) :
Substituting the expression of sj in (10) we get the equilibrium input price
!(H) =
+  + 2(m H)
2 (m H + 1) : (11)
Substituting (11) in (8) and (7) we get the output supply of each outsider
downstream rm qi and that of the cartel q

I , respectively,
qi (K;H) =
(m H) (  )
 (n K + 2) (m H + 1) ; (12)
and
qI (K;H) =
(  )(n K + 2(m H + 1)
2(n K + 2)(m H + 1) :
It follows immediately that prots at equilibrium of the entity I , and of
the outsider rms i (K;H) in the downstream market, write as
I(K;H) =
( )2
42
(2(m H)+n K+2)2
(n K+2)2(m H+1)2 ; (13)
and
i (K;H) =
( )2
2
(m H)2
(n K+2)2(m H+1)2 ; (14)
respectively. The prot of an outsider upstream rm is
 j (K;H) =
( )2
22
(n K)
(n K+2)(m H+1)2 (15)
Now we are in a position to examine whether, as in the case of pure horizontal
collusive agreements, no stable equilibrium exists (for n  3) when the entity
involves simultaneously downstream and upstream rms.
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Recall that the prot sharing rule is as follows. Participants share equally
the marginal variation of prots of the entity caused by the entry (exit) of
a new participant. For instance, consider an entity composed by one down-
stream and one upstream rm. When no entity exists the prot for a down-
stream rm is (0; 0).4 Hence as a participant of the entity, the dowstream
rm obtains (0; 0) plus half of the marginal variation in payo¤s, namely
[I(1; 1) i (0; 0)] =2. Whereas the upstream participant obtains
[I(1; 1) i (0; 0)] =2:
Using the prot functions for the entity and for the outsider rms, we can
state the following
Proposition 1 Assume that participating rms in a vertical collusive entity
share equally the marginal prot obtained by the entity due to the entry of a new
participant. Then, there exist at least a stable vertical collusive entity, including
one downstream rm and one upstream rm, if the number of downstream rms
n; satisfy the following condition:
n(m) < n < ~n(m):
where n(m) and ~n(m) dened in the proof.
Proof. Consider the entity composed by one downstream and one upstream
rm, i.e., H = 1 and K = 1: The conditions for external stability are:
(i) for the upstream participant with respect to the entry of a downstream
rm
I(2; 1) I(1; 1)
3
  j (1; 1): (16)
Substituting (13) and (15) ; the above condition is satised if and only if the
inequality
 3n4 + (2m+ 1)n2 +  4m2   6m+ 2n+  2m2   4m+ 2  0
is true. This is a polynomial of 4th degree of n; whose coe¢ cients change their
sign only once. Therefore this polynomial accepts only one positive root called
n^(m): Then, the inequality is true if n > n^(m):
(ii) for the upstream participant with respect to the entry of a new upstream
rm:
I(1; 2) I(1; 1)
3
   j (1; 1)  0: (17)
Substituting (13) and (15) ; we nd that the above condition is satised if the
inequality ( 6n  2)m2+(14n+ 6)m  (7n+ 5)  0 is true. This is always the
case because the polynomial ( 6n  2)m2+(14n+ 6)m (7n+ 5) = 0 has two
two roots which are both inferior to 2. Hence for m > 2; the inequality always
holds.
4Recall that if no agreement is established between the downstream and upstream rm
then no entity exist.
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(iii) The same statement can be made for the condition of external stability
of a downstream rm with respect to entry of a downstream rm.
(iv) downstream rm with respect to entry of an upstream rm:
I(1; 2) I(1; 1)
3
 i (1; 1): (18)
This condition is satised if and only if the inequality (4  3m)n2+(2m  1)n+
(m  1)  0 is true, namely if and only if
n  ~n(m)    4m+2m2+1 2(m 1)
p
12m 14m2+6m3 3
2m 1 :
The condition for internal stability are
i (0; 0) +
I(1; 1) 0(0; 0)
2
 i (0; 0)
I(1; 1) 0(0; 0)
2
  j (0; 0):
for the downstream and the upstream rm, respectively. Clearly, the condition
for the downstream is always satised being I(1; 1) 0(0; 0) > 0:Whereas, for
the second condition, substituting the expressions of payo¤s, we nd that this is
satised if and only if n > n(m)  2m
p 4m 7m2+6m3+m4+4 m2+2m3 1
 2m+7m2 1 : Denote
by n = max fn(m); n^(m)g : Then, the entity composed of one downstream and
one upstream rm is stable if
n(m) < n < ~n(m) (19)
It remains to be shown that the set dened by (19) is not empty. To show this,
we rst check that the set is not empty for the smallest admissible value of m;
namely m = 2: Since n(m) and ~n(m) are both monotonically increasing in m;
with ~n(m) increasing faster than n(m); if the set is not empty for m = 2; then
it is not empty for any m such that m > 2:QED:
An immediate consequence of the above proposition is that the entity com-
posed of one downstream and upstream rm is stable for n = 3 and m = 3:
Hence, the above proposition should be contrasted with the main result of Shaf-
fer (1995) stating that no stable agreement can exist for horizontal mergers when
n  3: In the framework of successive oligopolies, the marginal cost of down-
stream rms is no longer exogenous, as in the case of a single market where
horizontal mergers are analyzed. Consequently, a vertical entity comprising
upstream rms diminishes the number of input suppliers in the input market,
restricting accordingly competition in this market and leading ultimately to an
increase of the input price. In turn, this increase in the input price increases
the production costs of outsider downstream rms. Therefore, downstream out-
siders in the case of vertical collusive agreements have now an incentive to be
inside the entity, di¤erently from what is argued by Stigler (1950). This is
why we have just found at least one case of a weakly stable vertical agreement.
Nonetheless, the classical e¤ect documented by Stigler is still present. The out-
put price may increase due to existence of the vertical entity, increasing the
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incentive for downstream outsiders to stay outside the cartel. In sum, a vertical
agreement has three e¤ects: (i) it softens double marginalization for the entity
boosting its prot; (ii) it reduces the number of active upstream rms in the
upstream market leading to a shift upwards of the input supply and it reduces
the number of downstream rms that buy the input in the input market caus-
ing a shift downwards of the input demand schedule. The balance of these two
shifts can lead to an increase of a decrease of the equilibrium input price and,
nally, (iii) it creates asymmetries in the production costs of the downstream
rms: the entity produces at the marginal cost while the downstream rms at
the market price. The e¤ect on the equilibrium output price is ambiguous. The
equilibrium output price increases if the output quantity increases due to the
presence of the entity, or it may decrease, otherwise.
The stability of the vertical entity depends on the balance of these three
e¤ects which all depend on the parameters n;m;H and K. Internal stability of
the entity depends on the extent of the e¤ect in (i). More specically, internal
stability depends on the size of double marginalization. The higher the di¤erence
between the input price and the marginal cost to produce the input, the higher
the resulting double marginalization and thus the incentive to create the entity.
As far as upstream rms are concerned, their incentive to stay out of the entity
depends on the extent of the e¤ect in (ii). More precisely, they wish to stay out
of the entity if the increase in the input price due to the existence of the entity
is more protable than the prot obtained being in the entity due to the e¤ect
in (i). As for the downstream rms, their incentive to stay out depend on the
extent of the e¤ect in (ii) as well as in (iii). Namely, they have an interest to
be outside the entity if buying the input in the market allows a residual output
demand (captured in (iii)) that yields prots higher than their share of prots
in the entity.
Two last remarks are in order. First, in the case of the entity composed
of one downstream and one upstream rm both insiders receive a payo¤ that
exceeds the payo¤ of the outsiders:
i (0; 0) +
I  i (0; 0)
2
 i (1; 1);
I  i (0; 0)
2
  j (1; 1):
Hence, Stiglers statement according to which the only ones who benet from a
collusive agreement are the outsiders need not be true in vertical agreements.
Second, the analysis of stable vertical agreements developed above required a
precise prot sharing rule to specify the payo¤ of participants in the entity. The
rule we put forward is not the only rule that can be used in vertical agreements.
For instance, we could imagine that downstream rms share equally the prot
of the entity net of the prot attributed to upstream rm who receive the same
level of prots as the outsider upstream rms. It turns out that using this
sharing rule, no stable cartel exists. The condition that guaranties the external
stability of the upstream rms with respect to entry (or exit) of a downstream
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rm fails to hold. In fact, the prot of outsider upstream rms (which is also
the payo¤ that they receive in the entity) is a decreasing function of K: Hence,
the condition  f (K + 1; H) =  c(K + 1; H) >  c(K;H) is always violated.
This feature of the analysis shows that the assumption on prot sharing
is crucial for the analysis of stability, but it also reveals that our denition
of stability is quite strong. Should a vertical agreement be stable it implies
in particular that, given the H upstream rms, the vertical agreement of the
K downstream participants satisfy the inequalities c(K;H)  f (K   1; H)
and f (K + 1; H)  c(K;H), and similarly, given the K downstream rms,
the vertical agreement of the H upstream participants satisfy the inequalities
 c(K;H)   f (K   1; H) and  f (K;H + 1)   c(K;H), only. Therefore, a
weakly less demanding notion of stability would require only these inequalities
to hold. Nonetheless, this notion of stability does not correspond to a Nash
equilibrium of the game with n+m players and 2 (pure) strategies: "enter the
entity-remain outside the entity".
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we tackle the stability problem of collusive agreements not only
involving some downstream rms, but also embodying some upstream rms,
providing the nal market with a specic input. In other words, we extend the
stability analysis from pure horizontal collusive agreements to entities involving
some degree of vertical agreements. This endeavour is made possible due to the
exibility of the stability concept introduced above, but also to the framework
of successive oligopolies introduced elsewhere by the authors (see Gabszewicz
and Zanaj (2011)). This extension is crucial because many real-life collusive
agreements embody both upstream and downstream rms, inuencing thereby
the outcomes obtained both in the upstream and downstream market.
Our analysis reveals that stable entities exist for market structure in which
horizontal cartels would be unstable. It also reveals that the introduction of
some degree of vertical agreements weakens the Stigler statement according to
which "the major di¢ culty in forming a cartel is that it is more protable to
be outside a cartel than to be a participant". In the framework of successive
oligopolies, the marginal cost of downstream rms is no longer exogenous, as
in the case of horizontal agreements. When the entity also comprises upstream
rms, it reduces the number of input suppliers in the upstream market, restrict-
ing thereby competition in this market, leading in turn to an increase in the
input price. In turn, this increase enlarges the production costs of the outsider
downstream rms. Therefore, these downstream may have now an incentive to
be inside the agreement, di¤erently from what is argued by Stigler (1950).
Our paper has only scratched the surface of what looks a promising territory
for further research. Many questions are still remaining open after our analysis.
First, how robust are the conclusions of the paper ? It is clear that, like most of
the previous research in this eld, its conclusions hold in the framework of ex-
amples. Second, in reality, the institutional forms of collusive agreements are by
12
far more complex than those evoked in this paper where the agreement reduces
simply to the acceptance to belong to the entity or not. In particular, merging
existing rms often takes the form of acquisition of one rm by another one.
Such acquisitions reveal the existence of a market where rms are exchanged
among rms, in order to identify the optimal structure of a specic industry.
Finally, it would be natural to examine the e¤ects of entry in the upstream and
downstream markets, a¤ecting thereby the number n and m; viewed here as
parameters of the stability problem.
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